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Abstract
In terms of sign systems and the way they are
used, the experience of the interactive
resembles nothing else so much as it resembles
the experience of narrative.
Narrative is best understood as a relationship
between a Teller and a Listener, a relationship
that is formal, moral and structural.
The interactive reframes acts of narrative from
re-counts and re-presentations towards
simulation and generation, from editions to
instances. This markedly affects the kind of
signs that work within the semiotic ecology of
narrative relationships, unsettling the notion of
Telling, and re-working the ‘voice’ of a
narrator.
Narrative and Culture are inextricably linked in
the forming and continuance of world views.
Narrative is a meme, and interactivity a meme
variant of narrative. Change in the semiotic
economy of Narrative, in the meme and its
function, implies equivalent change in culture
and world views (ideology).
Keywords: interactivity, semiotics, sign
systems, narrative, culture,story, memes, 
An issue
The discussion of narrative is awkward
nowadays. This is because new media
technologies, and interactive technologies
especially, have disturbed not only our
experiences of what narratives are, but also our
cultural understandings of what narratives can
be and, so, how narratives relate to and model,
transmit, extend, confirm, contend with our
understandings of what our world can be.
In one sense, because they unfold across time,
stringing together a sequence of events
connected by a logic of cause and effect, all
interactive media may be thought of as
narratives. Those events work in the many and
different modes of operation, perception,
concentration and comprehension that are
necessarily part of the experience of the
interactive. From the semi-automatic nano-
moments of the cybernetic loops included in
moving a cursor across the screen, through the
decision:button-click day-to-day use of
spreadsheets, word-processors, web-browsers,
to the macro-moments of emotional reward and
psychological insight that accompany the
completion of an interactive fiction, in some
sense these experiences remain essentially
experiences of ‘narrative’.
However, in some discussions about interactive
media, most notably perhaps in relation to new
media artworks and games, narrative is a
contested term.
Narrative
This diagram (Figure 1) informs much of the
discussion to come. It is a representation of
sets of sign systems, of semiotic processes,
that, working together form the experience of
narrative. All parts are equally necessary, and
together they form a larger semiotic ecology.
 
Figure 1: the act of narrative
In the world of this paper narrative refers to a
necessarily social activity in which a there is a
Listener, a Teller and a story told. These terms
are used carefully. The Listener elsewhere may
be named as reader, player, viewer, audience,
and similarly the Teller may be called artist,
author, director. The terms are not important,
their relationships with each other, with the act
of narration and with the story told, are. 
In broad terms, and taking the first act of
narration to be the one that establishes their
roles, the Teller tells and the Listener hears. In
an economy of signs the Teller gives, supplies,
provides, the Listener takes, consumes,
receives. Tellers invent Listeners and Listeners
invent Tellers. The relationship is not mutual
nor reciprocal but existential. Acts of Telling
establish both a Teller and a Listener. Acts of
Listening bring into being both the Listener
and the Teller. Simultaneously.
Both or either Telling and Listening are
deliberate, conscious acts. They require acts of
mind such as concentration and an active,
willing, if temporary, belief in the thing told,
critical understanding, prediction (without
which there can be no surprise, nor any
satisfactory conclusion), phrasing (the
syntagmatic selection of words, events,
sequence, posture, tone, effects), and other
things, too.
It is important for the discussion to come to
note that nothing flows from the Teller to the
Listener. Both of them relate to the storyworld
(that is to the semiotic processes, the sign
systems of the storyworld) in a process of
discourse. And while the Teller may be thought
of as the (irreducible) author or maker of the
storyworld text, the Listener is also active
within the narrative space. Her concentration
and attendance, her alertness to the signs, and
the intertextualities she brings to the text,
constructs the narrative she hears.
Narratives function to bind a community
through sharing, and to maintain a shared
understanding of a world view. That
understanding is structural in that it concretises
and legitimises the overlapping domains of
morality and materiality, and it is social in that
it happens in the discourse relationships of the
act of narrative. 
Interactivity
Interactive is an awkward word at this time. It
has a general meaning which describes the
inter-relationship of objects and people. In this
meaning all things are interactive because our
experience of things is always interactive in the
sense of mental engagement with the object, in
the sense of discourse with the object which
has its own separate existence. In a more
specialised sense interactive refers to a
particular set of technology mediated
experiences. In this sense the word refers to the
discourse with artefacts which are, in some
way, changed or brought into being by the act
of viewing them and they do not have a
separate existence outside of the act of
viewing. It is in this, specialised sense, that
interactive is used here.
Interactivity  is  understood  as  a  ‘cybernetic
loop’  in  which  actions  and  displays  are
irrevocably  linked  as  instances  of
communication and control, and through which
a semiotic process runs.
Figure 2: a cybernetic loop of interactivity
Cause  and  effect  sweeps  clockwise  in  this
diagram, and while the sweep may be erratic
and  irregular,  it  is  characterised  by  the
continuity  of  a  semiotic  process  in  which
meaning  is  made,  derived,  sustained,
confirmed, replicated,  denied – in short  by a
semiotic  process  that  is  congruent  with  the
narrative experience. In terms of sign systems
and the way they are used, the experience of
the interactive resembles nothing else so much
as it resembles the experience of narrative. 
In  this  cybernetic  loop  user  and  system
mutually  modify  the  display  of  one  and  the
actions  of  another.  The  user/player’s
experience includes an awareness of how much
they shape or influence the unfolding sequence
of events. This is Janet H Murray’s agency [4],
an  effect  of  the  way  that  the  loop  pauses
around  the  user’s  actions,  holds  the  run  of
cause and effect, waiting for action.
The  cybernetic  loop  of  interactivity  is  about
communication:action and display:control that
form  a  continuity  of  feedbacks  and  mutual
modifications  running through time Although
there  exists  a  clear  separation  and
differentiation of states within the loop, within
the  user  (perception,  cognition  and  decision)
and within the system (event/conditions,  data
retrieval/calculation, render/assembly) there is
no  clear  differentiation  between  display  and
action,  both are communication and both are
control.  Within  this  loop,  display and  action
blur  in  the  form  of  rollover  images,  cursor
movements, the tap of a PDA stylus. They spin
away  in  a  melee  of  other  feedback  loops
spawned by acts of display and the display of
actions, by sensations and meanings. 
Interactivity  here  refers  to  a  (necessarily)
semiotic engagement with digital technologies,
to  artefacts  composed  of  changes  of  sound,
image,  moving  images,  letterforms,  graphic
shapes,  touches,  presses  and  movements,  to
mental states of certainty, anxiety, excitement,
frustration,  clarity  and  confusion.  To
experiences  which  make  up  a  range  of
increasingly important cultural activities.
The triple logic of storyworlds
As well as the Teller and the Listener, acts of
narrative include the story which is defined by
a dynamic triple logic. 
One logic is that of  plot, the order of events
bounded by a logic of cause and effect (as the
motivations of characters, as a priori
conditions and as a posteriori consequences
for actions within a described and supposedly
physical world, as inversions and purposeful
disruptions of the usual rules of the social
world), a logic which may be particular to the
one narrative (idiosyncrative), or derived from
more general logics used in other narratives
and the social world (normative). 
Sequence is also and likewise a logic of itself.
It rules the way time is handled. Compression
and elision, extension and dilation, regularity
and even-ness, reversal, flashback, summary,
repetition, these are time codes of storyworld.  
A third logic plays within story. Dynamically
linked with both sequence and plot, the logic
of syntagmatic editing deals with characters,
locations, numbers, explanations, references,
descriptions, which may be thought of as
content. Syntagmatic editing is a necessary
condition for story because experience (the
paradigm) can not be reproduced of itself. Like
all editing this one is not value free. Acts of
selection, omission and inclusion function
connotatively as much as denotatively within
the sign systems of narrative. 
Story, then, is the thing told that is boundaried
by the triple logics of sequence, plot,
syntagmatic editing. As such story must always
be a representation, but not necessarily a re-
presentation. Story not only recounts the world
but invents and extends it. 
In the relationship of the narrative it is the
Teller’s operation of the triple logic that forms
not only the content of the story but also
semiotically locates a viewpoint and a
structure. In the act of Listening it is not only
the content that is consumed, viewpoint and
structure are also heard, read, seen.
Example: spreadsheet as narrative
Understanding narrative as being firstly a
relationship and secondly a story bound by the
triple logic means that a spreadsheet like
Excel can be understood as a form of
narrative.
Plot here, the processes of cause and effect,
are experienced, particularly dynamically, in
the way a simple action results in many
changes. Amending the number value or
formula in one cell resonates through all
interconnected cells, formulae and values.
Sequence becomes play as what-if scenarios
are tried out to see the effect of a change here,
an alteration there. Syntagmatic editing
defines the selection of cell contents, the things
that are represented, calculated, noted, and
noticed. The cells are taken for the world.
The relationships of the narrative act become
like a mirror. The roles of Teller and Listener
overlap and overlay within the cybernetic loop
and its semiotic process.
Interactivity and narrative
Interactivity  is  understood  to  be  inherently
‘narrative’ in that it is sequential and arranges
time, it is built around structures of cause and
effect  and  is  clearly  syntagmatic  (if  only
because spatially and temporally framed by the
limits of display devices). These structures of
cause and effect connect action/display within
larger structures of meaning, and those larger
structures, themselves, have semiotic function. 
However, narrative is a contested term in the
discussion  of interactive media. As Lev
Manovich notes, in the The Language of New
Media, ‘the word narrative is often used as an
all-inclusive term, to cover up the fact that we
have not yet developed a language to describe
these strange new objects. It is usually paired
with another overused word – interactive. Thus
a number of database records linked together
so that more than one trajectory is possible is
assumed to create an “interactive narrative”.
But merely to create these trajectories is of
course not sufficient; the author has to control
the semantics of the elements and the logic of
their connection…. Another erroneous
assumption frequently made is that, by creating
her own path… the user constructs her own
unique narrative.’
[3]
What Manovich labels as narrative is more
properly, story. His commentary privileges the
maker, the author (the Teller) who has
‘control’ of  ‘the semantics of the elements and
the logic of their connection’ and takes from
the user or Listener an ability to experience
juxtaposition and make connections, to link
things and form meanings from fragments, to
discover a ‘logic’, and ‘constuct(s) her own
unique narrative’., Manovich, ibid.
The triple logics of sequence, cause and effect
and storytime, so deeply permeate the
quotidian experience of our lives that they are
organising principles for the way we read the
world. It is an ordinary act of mind to organise
in sequence, to establish chains of cause and
effect, to compress, extend or omit time, to
include and exclude details, events in
syntagmatic editing - in short to create
narratives. Faced with odd entries from
Manovich’s underlying database, that is,
presented with entries which are un-authored in
the ‘logic of their connection’ but which exist
as a set of things, the ordinary response, is to
form them into a set of related objects, to seek
and potentially find a narrative of sorts and to
fill in the gaps, to cloze the paradigm. Even to
the point where the ‘author’ and their purpose
is imagined, invented, evoked. This is the
illusion of Eliza, and it is a distinguishing
feature of detective fictions in books, films,
televisions and computer screens. It is also the
nature of the experience of narrative, the
essential semiosis by which order is found,
made, constructed, through which sensation
becomes perception.
Manovich’s model of an underlying database
implies the Listener in some way selecting
from pre-rendered units to build a more or less
meaningful sequence. Elsewhere, emergent
ludic theories contest the use of narrative as an
adequate term for some interactive media…..
“Traditional media are representational not
simulational. They excel at producing both
descriptions of traits and sequences of events
(narrative). A photograph of a plane will tell us
information about its shape and colour, but it
will not fly or crash when manipulated. A flight
simulator or a simple toy plane are not only
signs, but machines that generate signs
according to rules that model some of the
behaviours of a real plane. A film about a
plane landing is a narrative: an observer could
interpret it in different ways, but she cannot
manipulate it and influence how the plane will
land since film sequences are fixed and
unalterable.” 
[2] 
Gonzalo Frasca directs us to an alternative way
of creating content, rather than a set of pre-
rendered units there are a set of rules of
representation and behaviour which generate
content ‘on the fly’,  and indicates that there is
perhaps an essential difference between the
simulation and a narrative.
Yet the simulation is experienced within the
triple logics of story having sequence, plot and
syntagmatic editing  – sequence because events
happen across time (even if it is a supposedly
‘real’ as opposed to a condensed time), plot or
cause and effect because without that the rules
of the world manifest in the behaviour of the
‘plane’ would not occur nor would it have the
special case veracity of a simulation because
the rules that are physics are, themselves,
predicated upon ideas of consistency in cause
and effect. Sytagmatic selection permeates the
flight simulator, the monitor bound visual
representation necessarily lacks detail,  organs
of balance remain unaffected by visual
displays.
Frasca and Manovich identify an issue that the
interactive - as simulation or as
database:narrative - has reframed the
experience of story, creating, as Manovich puts
it, ‘strange new objects’.  However, what has
been reframed is not story – for that is still
bounded by the same triple logic – so much as
the space of narration and how it is understood
to relate to acts of Telling and Listening and
the social world. In part that reframing is in a
shift from acts of description to acts of
representation – from a spoken, written or
printed Telling, to a pictorial, or visually and
sonically representational, one (a shift from
arbitrary signs to apparently indexical signs).
From a Listening which is understood as
mediated by the personal position, the
intervening consciousness of a Teller, to one in
which there is no such intervening
consciousness immediately apparent or
available as a moral guide or syntagmatic filter
of the world. 
Example: paint packages as storyworld
Using bitmap image generation and
manipulation software (such as Paint Shop
Pro, Photoshop, Painter) illustrates some of
these points
To use the package means entering the same
kind of relationship with the software as
characterises narrative acts. It means
accepting the ‘storyworld’ of the interface- the
icons of paintbrushes, sponges, magnifying
glass, pencil, eraser -  and engaging with the
triple logic of the storyworld. Plot, that is
cause and effect, is self-evident in each mark
made within the monitor, sequence is the play
of time asan  image is reworked, History is
used to undo, Save and Load revert to
previous versions. Syntagmatic editing is
implicit in the operation of every tool but
especially in the underlying notion of
Selection where operations affect only defined
areas.
It is important to note that  these packages are
rule based and so simulational (or, perhaps
better, generational) in that they are ‘machines
that generate signs according to rules that
model some of the behaviours’ (Frasca, above)
of, well,light, and  other visual media.
As with the earlier example of spreadsheets,
the use of a bitmap image package reframes
the relationships of the narrative act, mixing
Teller an Listener through the loop of action
and display, and forming meaning through its
semiotic process.
Signs of Voice
Narrative exists as a shared space (diegesis)
which is separate from the social world (but
part of it). The sign systems of narrative, that
construct the act of narrative as a separate
activity within the social world, prepare and
maintain the conditions of Teller and Listener,
and permit the story to unfold. 
‘…. narration usually obeys rules that define
the pragamatics of (their) transmission. … a
pragmatics of popular narratives that is, so to
speak, intrinsic to them. For example, a
Cashinahua storyteller always begins his
narration with a fixed formula: ‘Here is the
story of -, as I’ve always heard it told. I will
tell it to you in my turn. Listen.’ And he begins
to close with another, also invariable, formula:
“Here ends the story of -. The man who has
told it to you is – (Cashinahua name)’
[1]
In the diagrammatic representation of the act of
narrative (above) Teller and Listener are
positioned so that they straddle the boundary
between the social world and the space of
narration. Usually Listener and Teller attend to
one or the other exclusively. To attend to the
storyworld means to move, in part, away from
the social world. 
The Teller is not necessarily the Narrator. The
space of narration, which here surrounds and
contains the storyworld, locates the rules and
characters of narration. Here are located the
signs about the story being told – its genre,
purpose – and also the apparatus through
which the story is told. The Teller and
Listener, as  it were, attending to ‘pragmatics
of transmission’.
The space of narration is the location of a
semiotics of narration – the signs that indicate
that a story is taking place (announcements,
tone of voice, graphical style), the kind of story
it is (genre), how it relates to the broader social
world (parable, allegory, moral, simulation,
exaggeration, etc), and signs that start of the
syntagm of ‘the willing suspension of disbelief’
– the selective act of concentration out of the
broader paradigm of diffused mind and into the
focussed act of engagement with the narrative
and, within that, the story. And this syntagm of
concentration is a necessary requirement of
narrative and characterises it 
The logic of the diegetic supervenes across the
boundaries of the storyworld and the space of
narration in which the rules of the storyworld
and its separation from the social world are
maintained. An extradiegetic logic supervenes
across the space of narration and the social
world. Together these logics locate the Teller
and Listener, direct their concentration towards
the storyworld, and bring into being the
Narrator either as a charcter or as a ‘voice’.
Usually the space of narration keeps apart the
social world and the storyworld, maintaining a
space between the signifiers and signifieds of
the diegetic and extradiegetic. 
Example: word processing as narrative
In operations of cut,copy, correct, the semotic
process of the cybernetic loop involved in
using a word-processor, the cause  and effect
actions  of typing and editing, the time-play of
reworking, and the syntagmatic editings of
selection and concentration, word-processing
in clearly narrative.
In  expressing ourselves (a telling
phrase,perhaps), in  selecingt the most
appropriate word or term, to get the idea
across the best we can – in this also is
semiosis. In my selection of words you read
more than the literal meaning. My selection
functions connotatively and in my selection
(my acts of Telling) is a story of position,
viewpoint, structuring my understanding of
this act of narrative. And in your acts of
Listening you can read my position, location,
attitudes,  because your discourse with these
words includes your knowledge of
connotation, of the struggle to express
yourself.
But when narrative moves from words told to
images formed, how then do we hear position,
location, attitude?
Cultural Continuity: narratives, memes,
technologies
Social worlds are constructed through
narratives and negotiated through accounts,
speculations, imaginings, analyses, predictions,
and explanations. They are perpetuated,
reproduced, gain continuity and have currency
in stories told between generations and across
places. 
No cultural  phenomena has a single purpose –
cultural economies (efficiencies of energy used
in sign systems) mean that things have plural
functions. Narrative is a way of transmitting
factual information (denotative content,
instructions) and more. The inter-relation of
Teller, Listener, story is a modelling sign for
other relationships such as ones of political
power, economic activities, kinship ties. 
Narrative is itself a technology and it uses
other technologies also. Even the earliest
narratives which (we imagine, narratively)
were spoken, employ a technology of voice,
changes in tone, vocabulary, rhythm becoming
rhyme. Or (we speculate, narratively) are
accompanied by musical instruments,
drawings, carvings, tapestries, acts of theatre,
ritual, courts. Historical accounts of book
technologies abound, and their effects on
narratives and cultures are discussed by
McLuhan, Ong and others. Radio, cinema,
television, computers, reframe and reform the
interplay of narrative, technology and culture.
The environment of technologies in which
narratives operate have a significant effect on
the kind of narratives, the form of narrative,
and the uses of narratives that are exploited. 
The signs that technologies make of
themselves (their integral sign-systems) work
economically and dynamically with the
(likewise integral) sign systems of narratives.
Like overlapping patterns of waves some inter-
relationships of the sign systems integral to
both technologies and narratives amplify the
peaks and troughs with no additional input of
energy. And some inter-relationships nullify
peaks and troughs. In such a fashion some
narrative forms are advantaged by particular
technologies while others are disadvantaged.
And, as with technologies, so with other parts
of the economy of signs and values that is the
culture. Within the sign economies of the
culture some narrative forms resonate
particularly while others languish. 
The prose novel, with its plots of unlikely
coincidences and the moral complexities of
motivated characters, resonates through
Western industrial cultures, and the long heroic
poem, languishes. 
Interactive technologies advantage narratives
in which Listener’s work to construct stories
from fragments. The ones we have seen so far
advantage narratives that are forensic (the
solution of puzzles, the assembly of evidence),
or generational (simulations, the interplay of
rules) more than narratives of characters, moral
dilemnas and coincidences. 
Example: Zork
A key Interactive Fiction, Zork is an
archetypal interactive narrative – it is forensic
and generational in the way in which the
player has to discover and then  exploit the
rules of the world in our to solve puzzles.  
Zork, is mediated by typed commands and text
responses. Usually these are (apparently)
objective descriptions of places, objects, the
few others who inhabit the world, or lists of
things. Occasionally the text responses have
personality, character, step out of role,
comment on our foolishness and the
artificiliaty of the world it describes. As with
Eliza, the voice of Zork brings a ‘feeling’ of
character and personality and it is often
experienced as a ‘narrator’ of some kind, but
not one that tells the story as relating ‘plot’,
that narrator function is reserved for the
discourse of the  player/Listener. See note 2.
Interactivity as Meme
Cultures and technologies frame narratives
which embed and embody the ideological
structures of the culture, and which reproduce
them with the necessary but subtle variation
that ensures evolution, adaptation and survival.
Richard Dawkins has proposed the idea of the
meme as a way of understanding cultural
replication (see note 1). Broadly put a meme
stands in relationship to the reproduction of
cultures as a gene stands to the reproduction of
biological organisms. Memes are subject to
processes of variation and mutation (much as
genes are) and survive only if they resonate
within the host culture, only if they are adopted
as patterns of behaviour or patterns of mind,
and in some way advantage what other memes
do.
Narrative is an ur-meme through which many
other memes move and each is flavoured by
the nature of the narrative, its relationships,
locations, contexts, the technologies used
As a meme, interactivity can be understood as
an experience that is a variant of narrative and
is culturally consumed as such. Seen as a
meme interactivity is astonishingly fecund [6],
in a short period of time it has become a
dominant cultural experience for many
working in the techonomies of well-
industrialised countries, and an increasingly
preferred leisure activity also. Its fecundity
indicates its survival within an environment
where uncountable other memes compete, and
it may be taken to mean that its contribution to
the culture in some way advantages, enhances,
promotes the overall functions of the culture.
Culture-narrative-technology frame, and are
framed alike, by ideological structures. A
change somewhere is a change everywhere. A
successful, fecund, variant narrative form
implies changes elsewhere both before and
after that meme appears. Before because the
conditions necessary for its fecundity have to
pre-exist its presence, and after because its
fecundity is change itself. A change in
narrative implies a change in technology and in
ideology.  Changes in ideology and technology
which are embodied in the experience of
narrative, of interactivity. 
The possibilities of memetic change in
narrative is limited because story itself, that is
the threefold logic of sequence, cause and
effect, and syntagmatic editing is not readily
susceptible to change. These three logics are,
themselves, particularly powerful memes in
that they are prime shapers of the (social)
world and in the ways they interconnect with
other memes. So powerful are these memes
that they are taken as the nature of things –
time flows, experience can only be discussed
(that is shared and made part of the social
world) by strategies of compression and
elision, that is by the logic of sequence. Things
happen and cause other things to happen.
Without cause and effect the meme of
(Western) science … well, isn’t. Syntagmatic
editing, like sequence, moves experiences from
the individual and isolated into the social and
meaningful. However, the space of narration
can readily accommodate change because this
a place of relationships rather than
representations. The relationship between the
Teller and the storyworld, between the Listener
and the storyworld, and between them both and
the space of narration itself (which of course
includes the signs of the other) is not only able
to accommodate change but is a place of
relatively  frequent and rapid meme change.
Technologies, memes in themselves, reframe
the inter-relationship of Teller, story and
Listener, and have done so fairly frequently.
To the point where change rather than stability
may be thought ordinary. An oral tradition
extended through iconic depictions, and itself
reframed by the arbitrary signs of written texts
and alphabets, the voice disembodied as radio,
the dramatic body displaced as television, the
larger move towards (apparently) indexical
narrative media in the cinema and computer
games, all of these are memes that reframe the
relationships of the space of narration. 
Interactivity is one of the most recent
reframings of the relationships of the narrative
acts – as such it represents a shift in our
cultural understandings of what narrative is and
can be.  The contested meanings of narrative in
current discussion and theorising is, itself, an
indicator of the disturbance that is a paradigm
shift in progress (see note 3).
In the labour (that is wealth generating)
activities of knowledge economies the
experience of interactivity, and its implicit
narratives and ideologies, becomes a dominant
experience. The social structures modelled in
the narrative acts of material manufacture are
fundamentally different to those modelled in
the narratives of spreadsheets, word
processors, image editors, web page authoring
software, programming. The meme of
interactivity is reproducing a different culture
to those of hewing, mining, melting and
materiality. And this is something that should
inform every moment of design or discussion
that addresses the interactive.
Voices and positions – narratives of the social
world
All acts of telling, and so all acts of narrative,
embed a ‘voice’ of the Teller in the space of
narration and in the storyworld. All acts of
telling are syntagmatic. The selections of
editing, vocabulary, imagery, events,
characters, are all connotative acts. All
selections are connotative, and locate the
narrative within the myths of the social world
and the perspectives of the Teller.  
In a spoken narrative or a written word
narrative, the distinct voice of the Teller
(and/or any invented narrator placed in the
storyworld) is obvious and evident. It is an
intervening consciousness, a syntagmatic filter,
whose location, viewpoint, attitude is revealed
connotatively in every operation of the triple
logic. Our implicit awareness of the
perspectives of others and our mental model of
intentionality (the empathic awareness of all
social animals) insists that we understand the
position of Teller:narrators.
The notion of a world shared among individual
members who are able, individually, to model
the world and the perspectives on the world
from the position of other members not only as
it is now but also as it may be when certain
actions occur is a pre-requisite of a social
world. It is a requirement of co-operation (for
example in hunting dog packs) and of the
social itself.
One function of narrative is as a way of
developing empathic models of the social
world, the perspectives and (likely) intentions
of (collaborating) others. The relationship of
the Teller and the Listener is a sign system
modelling this. To work it requires consistency
and congruence in the inter-subjective world,
in things like the behaviours of objects (causes
and their effects, effects and their causes) and
subjects (motivations, resonses, actions) so that
inference can become prediction (possibility
becoming probabilities). 
The triple logics of the story, and the inter-
relationships of Teller and Listener, form a
semiotic process in which such world sharing,
such models of perspectives and intentions
(motivations) develop and are shared – and
become believable (because if not believable
then they have no worth).  The connotations of
the Teller, of the narrative voice, sign its
perspectives and its positions, it difference
from the Listener, and so The Listener and
Teller are located. The sign world that
Listener’s inhabit is one in which connotation
as difference is marked and clear . The careful
use of word signs, the syntagmatic selection of
adjectives, nouns and phrasing to cajole, insult,
align, deny, persuade or whatever are part of
every act of speaking and hearing.  In such
places as conversations, business transactions,
academic papers, the reading of location and
perspective is familiar and automatic. The
Teller’s voice not only locates them and theirs
but also establishes the Listener’s place and
view. 
In this the Listener is an active part of the sign
system, an agent within the space of narration
just as the user is an agent in the cybernetic
loop of the interactive. The Listener constructs
not the story but the conditions of the space of
narration in which the story plays. And then
from the fragments of representation – from the
moments of cause and effect, the signs of
sequence, the particles that have come from
syntagmatic editing – from those fragments
placed in the conditions of the space of
narration, the Listener has the story, and has
become the Teller too.
In the interactive, in the narrative space driven
by the action:display sequence of the
cybernetic loop, where Listener:Teller roles
merge and mirror the narrator is a ghostly
presence that may be our own shadow. 
Example: cutesy cats and clever clips
The experience of interactivity resembles
nothing so much as it resembles narrative.
Narratives are social acts – there is no
lonelier space than an uninhabited narrative
space. Lonely and anxious. So, the narrative
space of interactivity, with is ghostly narrator
who is both Listener and Teller – well, we are
offered the opportunity to inhabit the space
with characterful helpers, cutesy cartoon cats
and intrusively helpful paperclips, system
status boxes that are as  polite as a butler.
Ending
In the space of narration that is characteristic
of the interactive the role of the Listener and
the signs of the Teller are unlike those in other
narrative  forms, and so are the structural
models and ideologies they carry as memes.
For the Listener the active involvement in the
construction of the story is imbricated with the
actions that propel the cybernetic loop forward
along its semiotic axis. The actions required to
move the narrative experience along are of a
special kind (Aarseth notes how different they
are to the ‘turning of  a page’ [7], Murray sees
the ‘agency’ of these actions [4]) that literally
bring into being the materiality of the text,
summoning image, word, sound into transient,
temporary and ephemeral displays of
syntagmatic instances from otherwise invisible
paradigms.
And the Teller seems to be rendered voiceless.
Although we may detect  an authorial presence,
consciousness and even character (or at least
the signs for these) in some interactive
artworks, and even recognise the stylistic
authorship of some games in their graphics,
gameplay, puzzles and atmosphere, in much of
the interactive the Teller is a particularly
anonymous presence. At best they set the rules,
provide the fragments, and say ‘get on with it’
to the Listener. Elsewhere, well, what is the
‘voice’ of Word, Excel, Photoshop? Similarly
in software that functions as a simulator or
generator while there may be a  clear stylistic
identity and a sign system that authenticates the
experience as ‘real’ or ‘equivalent’, the
authenticating sign system replaces the Teller
as a person with the Teller as the machine
faithfully following the laws of physics. The
Teller (author, creator) effaces themselves to
authenticate the reality of the engine and
paradoxically affirms the narrative nature of
the experience. 
Interactivity, a variant of the narrative meme,
remixes the roles and relationships of the space
of narration. Quieting the voice of the Teller,
augmenting the role of the Listener, including
the semiotic process of the cybernetic loop and
the emergent materiality of the interactive text,
has far reaching effects in the ecology of signs
of  these narratives. 
Interactivity is one configuration of memeplay
across culture-narrative-technologies. As such
it embeds and embodies sign systems about the
world and its possibilities of representation,
and advantages stories which map out those
particularities. It is not the only narrative form
we have, but it is one of particular significance
for the world we live in now.
‘The ideological and cognitive functions of
narrative are inextricably fused: the cognitive
is the operational form of the ideological, and
the ideological represents the political
consequences of the cognitive. ….. (w)ith these
interwoven functions, narrative maps the world
and its inhabitants and locates us within that
changing textual landscape, constantly
broadening our mental cartography.”
 [8]
The voiced narrator is an intervening
consciousness and models the viewpoint trade
that is empathy, that is the social understanding
of the validity and legitimacy of others.
Spoken, written and printed texts carry clear
signs of connotation, of viewpoint, in the
redaing of the syntagmatic selection of words.
In narratives that work through (apparently)
indexical image and sound, connotation is
necessarily less clear. When the form the text
takes comes about through of the Listener’s
actions and recasts Listener as Teller, our
ability to locate ourselves within that textual
landscape, to identify and handle the
ideological becomes questionable.
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